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When is the New York Court of Appeals
Justified in Deviating from Federal Constitutional
Interpretation?
Honorable Richard D. Simons*
Professor Barty Latzer:
The next topic is entitled: "When is the New York Court of
Appeals justified in deviating from federal constitutional
interpretation? Our presenter is in a particularly good position to
answer that question, since he served on the New York Court of
Appeals. He served during a period in which the court, I think,
began to acknowledge the New York State Constitution perhaps
more than any time in its history, certainly any time more than its
recent history. Judge Richard D. Simons received his Bachelor's
Degree from Colgate University, and an LLB Degree from the
University of Michigan Law School, and an Honorary Law
Degree from the University of Albany Law School. After time in
practice, he spent most of his legal career serving on the bench in
one capacity or another. He was first elected Justice of the New
York Supreme Court. You will notice that a Supreme Court
judge in New York is called a "Justice," and then when he gets
to the highest position in the state he is demoted back to "Judge."
Judge Simons served as Justice of the Supreme Court for many
years.1
Judge Simons was appointed as a Justice in the Appellate
Division where he served in both the Third and Fourth
Departments.2 From there, he was appointed Associate Judge of
the New York Court of Appeals, the highest state court in New
York by Governor Mario Cuomo.3 We are delighted to have him
* Judge Richard D. Simons, Judge New York Court of Appeals (retired
January 1997).
' See Patrick M. Connors, Dedication to the Honorable Richard D. Simons,
13 Tou1o L. REv. 587-88 (1997). Judge Simons served for eight years on the
New York State Supreme Court. Id.2id.
3 Id. at 589.
1
Simons: State Court Interpretation
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1998
TOURO LAWREVIEW
with us and it is obvious that he continues to be active by trying
to influence the lawmaking process in New York State. He is the
Chairman of the New York State Bar Foundation, a member of
the American Law Institute, and a Fellow of the American Bar
Foundation. So please give a warm welcome to Judge Richard
D. Simons.
Judge Simons:
Thank you, Professor Latzer. Many have noted your
observation about Justices of the Supreme Court and Judges of
the Court of Appeals and explained it by stating there is no justice
in the Court of Appeals. Earlier this morning you were
discussing substantive law in New York. I would like to take you
to another area, one that has concerned me increasingly as I
served on the Court of Appeals: the procedural aspects of state
constitutional law. The problem is not significant when you talk
in terms of the free speech clause, which differs textually from
the United States Supreme Court provision. When the court
examines provisions that are exactly the same or very similar,
however, how does the Court of Appeals determine when it will
depart from interpretation of the language made by the United
States Supreme Court? Furthermore, if the court decides that a
departure should be made, how does the court justify the
departure? For example, refer to the search and seizure
provision Article 1, section 12 of the New York State
Constitution.4 It is exactly the same as the search and seizure
prohibition contained in the Fourth Amendment' because it was
4 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. Article I section 12 of the New York State
Constitution provides in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized.
Id.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states in pertinent part:
638 [Vol 14
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copied directly from the Federal Constitutional provision. There
is no difference in language.
How may the New York Court of Appeals take a search and
seizure case before it, resting on federal and state grounds,
knowing that the federal court has said the right of privacy
interest is superseded by the state interest in permitting that
search, and say that the New York Constitution prohibits such a
search? How does it justify that kind of a departure from
Supreme Court precedent? Justifying such inconsistency is
important because the credibility and legitimacy of any court
depends upon the principled basis upon which its decisions rest.
Hence, if the court is going to disagree with the Supreme Court,
there should be a legitimate basis for the disagreement. The
Court of Appeals may not merely assume that its analysis of the
problem is better than the analysis of the nine people down in
Washington.
For many years this was not a particularly important problem.
The Court of Appeals established and decided many cases based
upon the state constitution. Someone mentioned Sharrock v. Dell
Buick-Cadillac6 earlier which found procedural differences under
the state constitution. The right to counsel7 is a typical example
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
Id.
6 45 N.Y.2d 152, 379 N.E.2d 1169, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1978). The New
York Court of Appeals held that:
[S]ections 200, 201, 202 and 204 of the Lien Law, insofar as they
empower a garageman to conduct an ex parte sale of a bailed
automobile, fail to comport with traditional notions of procedural due
process embodied in the State Constitution, as they deprive the owner of
the vehicle of a significant property interest without providing any
opportunity to be heard.
Id.
7 N.Y. CoNsT. art. I, § 6. Section 6 provides in pertinent part: "In any trial
in any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend
in person and with counsel as in civil actions and shall be informed of the
1998 639
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in which the New York State right to counsel is much broader
than the federal right to counsel8 . These differences were
limited. When appeals presented both federal and state grounds,
the Court of Appeals held routinely, almost by rote, say that
whatever action was challenged was either valid or invalid under
both the federal and state constitution. As the law began to
develop, we reviewed cases where we invoked the state
constitution without much analysis.
In People v. Class9, a case involving a search for a Vehicle
Identification Number on the automobile, was first decided in our
court on both state and federal grounds. The United States
Supreme Court ultimately reversed our order saying there was no
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The case was then
remanded to our court, and with little discussion or analysis, it
was decided that the search was unlawful based on the state
constitution.
Moving a little bit further, we had cases under the search and
seizure law in which we disagreed with the Supreme Court but in
doing do we just relied on stare decisis. When the United States
Supreme Court decided Gates'0 and Leon," the Court's decision
nature and cause of the accusation and be confronted with the witnesses against
him." Id.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This amendment states in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosecutions ... [one shall] have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence." Id.
9 63 N.Y.2d 491, 473 N.E.2d 1009, 483 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1984), overruled
by New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) (holding that a police search for a
Vehicle Identification Number and the subsequent seizure of a gun was
constitutional as the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
vehicle). On remand, the New York Court of Appeals held that "[w]here . . .
the State Constitution has been violated, we should not reach a different result
following reversal on Federal constitutional grounds unless respondent
demonstrates that there are extraordinary or compelling circumstances. That
showing has not been made." People v. Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431, 433, 494
N.E.2d 444, 445, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313, 314 (1986).
10 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 217 (1983) (holding "that it is wiser
to abandon the 'two-pronged test' established by our decisions in Aguilar and
Spinelli. In its place we reaffirm the totality of the circumstances analysis that
traditionally has informed probable cause determinations.").
640 [Vol 14
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directly conflicted with rules that we had established for several
years about the search and seizure law in New York State. We
disagreed with the Supreme Court, declaring the searches
unlawful using the authority of our earlier decisions and invoking
stare decisis. In essence, we stated that we would rely on our
rules under the state constitution and not use the of rules
established by the United States Supreme Court in Gates, Leon,
or similar cases.
It became apparent after a while, at least to me, that this was
not going to work. With the personnel of the Supreme Court
changing; with the direction of the Supreme Court decisions
changing, it was very clear that there were going to be some
radical - maybe radical is too strong a word - there were going
to be some differences in our view of what the law should be and
the Supreme Court's view of what the law should be. I thought it
was important that we make some determination of a
methodology, an analysis that we would follow, to establish a
structure and try to anchor a body of law that we would follow,
and could guide our lower court judges.
When deciding to invoke the state constitution as opposed to the
Federal Constitution, scholars have generally pointed out three
different approaches. The first approach is the primacy method.
This method assumes that the state constitution is superior in time
and status to the Federal Constitution, so every case should be
approached initially by analyzing the state constitutional provision
and deciding it on that ground if possible. Certainly, the state
constitutions were earlier in time in the original thirteen states. I
do not know about applying the method in the other states of the
union, but we can legitimately say in New York that our
constitution is older and New York should be entitled to look first
at its state law. That has some problems in my view because it
1 See U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule should not be applied to deny the prosecution
the use of evidence based on a search warrant ultimately found to be invalid).
"Evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said
that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged
with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 919.
1998
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implicitly assumes that the federal constitution would allow this
conduct. But it is settled law of these areas that the states may
never go below the floor established by the Federal Constitution.
State constitutions may grant more protections than the federal
constitution provides, but states may never grant less protection
than federal provisions afford individuals. The Federal
Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
The second method used is the dual analysis method. The court
analyzes cases under both federal and the state provisions and if
the conduct is protected under either one, then the challenging
party prevails. The unfortunate consequence of this method is the
insulation of any federal interpretation from Supreme Court
review. The Court of Appeals finds itself stating what the federal
constitution says on certain subjects, but under Michigan v.
Long, 2 that determination may never be reviewed in the Supreme
Court, so it remains in the body of law, though it may not be
authoritative. The other consequence is that half of the opinion is
dictum, because half of it is not needed.
The third view is a supplemental or interstitial approach in
which the court first examines the Federal Constitution. If the
issue is not covered or protected by the Federal Constitution, then
the court moves on to the state document, and tries to determine
if the conduct is addressed and, if so, to determine the
consequences. The New York Court of Appeals has at one time
or another, and each individual judge has at one time or another,
adopted and rejected every one of these three approaches. We
have not been able to make up our minds about how to proceed
when we review these issues. I do not think that is necessarily
fatal, but it does leave a gap in the analytical process of state
constitutional cases.
If there is any trend, I think the trend is to analyze the case first
on the grounds of the Federal Constitution, and then, if the
problem is resolved, indicate that the Court need go no further
because the conduct is protected. There are two or three recent
12 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
[Vol 14
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cases where that has been done. In Grumet v. Cuomo, '3 the court
struck down a provision relying upon the Kurtzin test 4. The
Court did not decide whether the proposal would pass
constitutional muster under the state constitution. 5
When the court reaches the subject of how the analysis will
proceed, assuming it decides that it is going to analyze it on state
grounds, it must be determined how to proceed. The first serious
attempt to lay out some formulation on that question was made in
People v. P.J. Video.16 That case suppressed pornographic
materials as a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 7 The Court
of Appeals first suppressed the evidence declaring the seizure
unlawful. The case was then appealed to the United States
Supreme Court." The Supreme Court held that there was no
Fourth Amendment violation.19 When the case came back to us
on remand, we suppressed the pornographic materials again."0 In
13 90 N.Y.2d 57, 681 N.E.2d 340, 659 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1997) (holding that
singling out the Village of Kiryas Joel religious community for special
treatment violated the Establishment Clause).
14 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The test measures
whether governmental action is permissible pursuant to the Establishment
Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. "[F]irst, the action must have a
secular purpose; second, it must not have a principal or primary effect that
advances or inhibits religion; and third, it must not foster excessive
governmental entanglement with religion." Id. at 612-13.
15 See Grumet v. Cuomo, 90 N.Y.2d 57, 181 N.E.2d 340, 659 N.Y.S.2d
173 (1997).
11 People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 566, 483 N.E.2d 1120, 493
N.Y.S.2d 988 (1985).
17 Id. at 572, 483 N.E.2d 1124, 493 N.Y.S.2d 992.
1 
-New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 474 U.S. 868 (1986). The Supreme Court
stated that the New York Court of Appeals' construction of its prior decisions
concerning this area that a warrant requirement for films and books
encompasses a higher standard of probable cause. Id. at 874. However, the
Court has never required such a standard. Id. The Court reversed and
remanded to the New York Court of Appeals, holding "that, evaluated under
the correct standard of probable cause, the warrant was properly issued and the
videocassettes of the five movies should not have been suppressed." Id. at
878.
19 See New York v. P.1. Video, Inc., 474 U.S. 868 (1986).
o People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508
N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986). The court stated that "[t]he legal reasoning supporting
1998 643
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reinstating the suppression order on state grounds, the court tried
to set out some parameters, to create a structural analysis that
should be made in analyzing these cases2" to find a principled
basis for distinguishing the state constitutional language.
Once again, we were dealing with exactly the same words; so
why should the Court of Appeals say they meant one thing when
the United States Supreme Court says they meant something else?
The case involved a non-interpretive problem, where the
language is the same, you cannot fall back on differences in the
texts of the language of the provision." The Court has to find
some basis for distinguishing the two clauses. We stated that the
court should look first at the State statutory or common law to see
how the particular right involved was treated. Second, it should
determine whether the state has historically protected the right.
our views, our understanding of principles of federalism, and this State's legal
and cultural traditions all lead us to conclude that we should depart from the
Federal rule stated in this case." Id. at 309, 501 N.E.2d at 564, 508
N.Y.S.2d at 916. The court held that "this warrant application did not
demonstrate the probable cause required under the provisions of article I, § 12
of the State Constitution and accordingly, on reargument following remand
from the United States Supreme Court, we affirm the order of the County
Court." Id.
2 People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508
N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986). Listing the factors, the court stated:
This perception of 'the average New Yorker' involves a mix of factors
peculiar to this State, including our legal traditions and our cultural and
historical position as a leader in the educational, scientific and artistic
life of our country, as well as a recognition that New York is a State
where freedom of expression and experimentation has not only been
tolerated, but encouraged.
Id.
22 Id. at 303, 501 N.E.2d 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d 911. In a discussion of a
noninterpretive analysis, the court stated that:
A non-interpretive analysis attempts to discover, for example, any
preexisting State statutory or common law defining the scope of the
individual right in question; the history and traditions of the State in its
protection of the individual right; any identification of the right in the
State Constitution as being one of peculiar State or local concern; and
any distinctive attitudes of the State citizenry toward the definition,
scope or protection of the individual right.
[Vol 14
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Third, it should be determined whether the state constitution
identifies the right as one of particular state or local concern, and
in the fourth, the Court should examine whether their exists a
distinct attitude in the state for the protection of the particular
right. Those inquiries are similar to inquiries that other state
courts have used in trying to find some methodology for
reviewing state questions.'
The effort is to try and make the result hinge on something
different about New York State rather than merely have it hinge
on when the seven judges of the New York Court of Appeals look
I See, e.g., West v. Thompson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah
1994). The court stated:
There are at least four models for determining when and under what
circumstances courts should base decisions on their own
constitutions where there are related or similar federal constitutional
provisions... primacy approach, [whereby] a state court looks first
to the state constitutional law, develops independent doctrine and
precedent, and decides federal questions only when state law is not
dispositive . . . interstitial approach [which] establishes a
presumption that federal law is controlling and reaches state
constitutional issues only when the case cannot be resolved on
federal grounds alone .. .dual sovereignty approach analyze[s]
both federal and state grounds for the decision, even where the case
can be resolved on federal grounds alone . . . lockstep approach
[which] does not allow independent interpretation of a state
constitution, effectively ceding interpretative authority for the state's
constitution to the United States Supreme Court.
Id. See also State v. Badger, 450 A.2d at 347 (Vt. 1982) (stating "[there
is] great potential for great friction between the state and federal
judiciaries, and concomitant damage to the authority, efficiency, and
finality of the United States Supreme Court."); State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d
952 (N.J. 1982). The New Jersey Supreme Court promulgated seven
situations whereby a state could arrive at a different conclusion than the
federal judiciary:
(i) textual differences in the federal and state constitutional
provisions, (ii) legislative history of state provision indicating that it
should be interpreted differently, (iii) state law predating United
States Supreme Court decisions, (iv) structural differences between
the state and federal constitutions, (v) subject matter of peculiar
state interest, (vi) particular state history or traditions, and (vii)
public attitudes in the State.
Id. at 965-67
6451998
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at a question differently than do the nine judges of the United
States Supreme Court. The subjective distinctions and viewpoints
are philosophical approaches, not legal approaches.
The formula that we set out in P.J. Video certainly was not
perfect, but it was our attempt to find some basis, some type of
analysis that we could follow, recognizing that litigants were
increasingly realizing that we were willing to fall back on the
state constitution. For many years, cases would come before us
and we would almost salivate over getting a chance to review
them on state grounds, but nobody would ever plead that the
challenged conduct violated the state constitution, so we could not
proceed on state grounds.
We followed the formula that was set forth in P.J. Video24 for a
while. Some prominent cases were People v. Alvarez,' People v.
Kohl,' 6 People v. Harris;27 but after a relatively brief period of
24 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986). The court
stated:
[N]otwithstanding an interest in conforming our State Constitution's
restrictions on searches and seizures to those of the Federal
Constitution where desirable, this court has adopted independent
standards under the State Constitution when doing so best promotes
"predictability and precision in judicial review of search and seizure
cases and the protection of the individual rights of our citizens."
Id. (quoting People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 488 N.E.2d 439, 497
N.Y.S.2d 618 (1985)).
2 70 N.Y.2d 375, 515 N.E.2d 898, 521 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1987). The court
stated:
We have long recognized that while this court is, of course bound
by the decisions of the Supreme Court in matters of Federal law,
"in determining the scope and effect of the guarantees of
fundamental rights of the individual in the Constitution of the State
of New York, this court is bound to exercise its independent
judgment and is not bound by a decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States limiting the scope of similar guarantees in the
Constitution of the United States."
Id. at 378, 515 N.E.2d at 899, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 213. (quoting People ex
rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, 68 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 503 N.E.2d 492, 494,
510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (1986)).
26 72 N.Y.2d 191, 527 N.E.2d 1182, 532 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1988). The court
stated:
646 [Vol 14
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time, a majority of the members of the court found it too
constricting. They rejected the P.J. Video formulation, agreeing
to a statement in Chief Judge Kaye's concurring opinion it was
not a binding analysis, but merely something to be considered.
So I cannot tell you now how the court will approach state
constitutional analysis today, or, if it does decide to do so, how
that analysis will come out.
From my own point of view, I think of a judicial system that is
integrated from the Supreme Court on down to the trial level,
thus it comes naturally to me to use a supplementary approach, to
look first to the federal law and look for a gap before
approaching the question under state law. If the federal
constitution resolves the question, I would not go any further.
Many courts and judges would, preferring to analyze another
way. Whether we approach state constitutional law in this
matter or not, I think it is imperative that some analytical
approach be developed so that the lower courts, as well as
lawyers and litigants can know how these questions are to be
reviewed and determined. There should be some articulable basis
for a disagreement with the highest court in the land beyond a
differing view of the law. That kind of analysis leads to
instability, and it leads to the kind of criticism and loss of prestige
that we have seen resulting from some Supreme Court decisions.
Once the personnel of the Court changed, the judges merely
In determining whether to exercise independent judgment under the
New York State Constitution to provide greater protection than the due
process floor set by the [United States] Supreme Court, we first look to
the texts of the Constitutions. If the provision at issue differs from that
of its Federal counterpart, we examine the historical basis for the
distinction. If the rationale for the differing text is not material to the
analysis, then we look further to see whether there are fundamental
justice and fairness concerns of the State which are left unaddressed
under prevailing Federal law and which are therefore warranted under
the independent broader State protection.
Id. at 197, 527 N.E.2d at 1185, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 48 (citations omitted).
2 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1991). The court
held "that the [United States] Supreme Court's rule does not adequately protect
the search and seizure rights of citizens of New York." Id. at 436, 570
N.E.2d at 1052-53, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 703-04.
1998 647
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recycled some of their older dissents and made them into majority
opinions supported by new personnel in the Court. I do not think
a court can sustain that kind of conduct over an extended period
of time. But I will cite to you Payne v. Tennessee2 and United
States v. Dixon29 to illustrate my criticism.
I think that the Court of Appeals confronts a similar risk unless
it has some systematic method of taking on these questions. It
puts itself in a position where it is questioned merely for
disagreeing with the Supreme Court, because it does not like
what the Supreme Court said. There is nothing to stabilize the
law except the judge's personal analysis of the case, which may
be very good, it may indeed be fine; but it nevertheless is merely
a different view of the law than the Supreme Court may have
taken. And I give you one illustration of how some articulable
basis can be used, but has not been used in the past.
People v. Scott" was a case involving airplane searches. It
came to the Court of Appeals following the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, which had held aerial searches
were not unlawful.3' I think the public, who probably does not
think the evidence should be suppressed in any event, can accept
the fact that the United States Supreme Court is ruling for an
entire nation and some cases it is considering may have firearms
or drugs located on ranches, that in some cases are almost as big
as states. I think that you might understand that the Supreme
Court said we are not going to foreclose aerial searches because
we have these problems in some but not all states. Moreover, I
think the public might accept the fact that the Court of Appeals,
looking at the same question, might say we do not have any
ranches and farms that encompass thousands and thousands of
acres here. We think that the expectation of privacy in New
York State overrides the public interest in allowing area
28 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
29 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
30 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992) (holding that
where "landowners fence or post 'No Trespassing' signs on their private
property or, by some other means, indicate unmistakably that entry is not
permitted, that they will be free from unwanted intrusions is reasonable.").
31 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
[Vol 14
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searches.32 That is the kind of reasonably objective articulable
basis for interpreting the similar provisions differently that I think
the public will accept. This is the kind of basis that would
stabilize the court's decisions. When we differ with the Supreme
Court that is the kind of approach that the Court of Appeals
should use. Hopefully, it will. These are works in progress, and
it takes a long time to develop something similar to a common
law method. I think it is important, and I hope that the Court
will approach state constitutional questions with that goal in
mind. The question has been on the back burner in recent years,
but it will arise again. Constitutional questions continue to arise,
and the Bar has become more familiar with the fact that the state
constitution is a great source for relief. I am concerned that the
court approaches these continuing questions with those thoughts
in mind.
Professor Latzer:
Since we are a bit ahead of schedule and we have the benefit of
having Judge Simons with us, I thought we would detour from
the plan and take some questions or comments from the audience.
The Audience:
Judge, you mentioned that by deciding the case under the state
constitution, the Court of Appeals can insulate itself from
Supreme Court review. You seem to indicate you did not think
that was a justification for the Court of Appeals to decide a case
under the state constitution. I was wondering if you could say
whether or not that is generally shared by the court.
InId.
1998 649
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Judge Simons:
I did not mean to put it quite that way. There are many people
who would say that where parties argue constitutionality on both
federal and state questions, why not decide both state and federal
grounds? The law cannot develop, however, if the New York
State Court of Appeals decides a federal question and then states
we are not going to let the Supreme Court review it (i.e. under
the rule of Michigan v. Long). 3  Nevertheless, in the Immuno
case,"' this was a dispute the court had. After the court's original
decision in Inmuno, the case went to the United States Supreme
Court35 and that Court remanded the case directing the Court of
Appeals to review the case in light of the Supreme Court's
intervening decision in Milkovich.36 The Court asked us to make
a federal analysis so they could look at it again.37 We decided the
appeal on state grounds preventing the Supreme Court from
reviewing our decision, but in the process we said this is what
Milkovich means.3s I do not think that is the way the law should
3463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
' Immuno A.G., v. Moor-Jankowski, 74 N.Y.2d 548, 549 N.E.2d 129, 549
N.Y.S.2d 938 (1989).
31 Immuno A.G., v. Moor-Jankowski 497 U.S. 1021 (1990). The United
States Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and
remanded to the New York Court of Appeals for further consideration in light
of Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990). Id.
36 497 U.S. 1 (stating that "a separate constitutional privilege for
'opinion' was not required in addition to established safeguards regarding
defamation to ensure freedom of expression guaranteed by the first
Amendment....").37 Immuno, 497 U.S. at 1021.
31 Immuno, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 566 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1991).
The Court of Appeals stated:
Milkovich, however, puts an end to the perception - as it turns out,
misperception - traceable to dictum in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 339-40, that, in addition to all other Federal
constitutional protections, there is a "wholesale defamation
exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion.'" Thus,
statements of opinion relating to matters of public concern are today
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develop institutionally. If we are going to decide federal law, we
ought to allow the highest federal court in the country to say
whether we are right or wrong. In addition, we should not
decide federal law and then say you cannot or you will not take
this up, because for our purposes we are deciding it on state
grounds.
Professor Robert F. Williams:
I was just going to say that I share your opinion, Judge Simons,
that more and more things are going to be coming to the state
courts because of the expansion of the United States Supreme
Court. I am very much interested in the First Amendment39 as it
applies to freedom. We lost the compelling-interest test40 and we
the lost the Restoration Act4 which puts us into the state courts.
Moreover, I am wondering if you have any insight on the New
York Constitution42 and the religious freedom rights, especially in
light of the latest developments at the federal constitutional level?
no less subject to constitutional protection, but speech earns no
greater protection simply because it is labeled "opinion."
Id. at 242-43, 567 N.E.2d at 1273, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
31 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." Id.
I See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) ("We
conclude today that the sounder approach, and the approach in accord with the
vast majority of our precedents is to hold the [Sherbert] test inapplicable to
such challenges."); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Sherbert
test states that "governmental actions that substantially burden a religious
practice must be justified by a compelling state interest." Id.
11 See City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (holding that the
religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [hereinafter RFRA] exceeds
Congress' power). RFRA "prohibits '[glovemment' from 'substantially
burden[ing]' a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability unless the government can demonstrate the burden
is '(1) in the furtherance of a compelling state interest; and (2) the least
restrictive means of furthering that.., interest.'" Id.42 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section 6 provides in pertinent part:
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Judge Simons:
I guess the short answer is no. I think the Court of Appeals,
during the time that I was there, (and I have not been there since
January), has struggled a little bit because it knew Lemon v.
Kuzman 3 was questionable authority. However, we had several
cases that came before us where we had to go back to it. Indeed,
we had a case just before I left regarding Alcoholic Anonymous
programs in the state prisons." However, I do not remember if
that case was presented on state grounds,45 my memory just fails
me there, but there is that concern. I think the court, as a whole,
welcomes the chance to expound on the state constitution. As I
said earlier, many times lawyers just do not give thought to the
state constitution and I think there is a great segment of the Bar
that does not even know there is one.
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this
state to all mankind; and no person shall be rendered incompetent to be
a witness on account of his opinions on matters of religious belief; but
the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to
excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the
peace or safety of this state.
Id.
4 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
44 Griffin v. Coughlin, 88 N.Y.2d 674, 673 N.E.2d 98, 649 N.Y.S.2d 903
(1996).
41 Id. at 88 N.Y.2d at 714-15, 673 N.E.2d at 123, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
The court did not address an independent state grounds action but stated that:
[it is our conclusion that petitioner has failed to make an adequate
record to state a claim for an Establishment Clause violation. The
petition cites nothing of a religious nature about this particular ASAT
program or its practices other than the fact that it is modeled after the
principles of A.A. which make references to 'God' and a 'Higher
Power.' We hold that under the facts and limited record in this case,
the inclusion of the 12-step A.A. component into the ASAT program
did not make the program a religious exercise and, therefore, did not
violate petitioner's rights under the Establishment Clause of the 1st
Amendment.
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Professor Williams:
That is actually what I wanted to ask you. New Jersey has said
that it will follow this fact or criteria approach. However, I have
been slightly critical of that in academic literature, and I think it
is a terrific mechanism to educate the Bar. Would you think that
even though the New York Court of Appeals does not always
follow the Supreme Court that the New Jersey Supreme Court
does not follow it all the time either? Alternatively, maybe with
the current makeup of the bench, the court is not quite sure how
it is going to analyze a decision unless it relies on practicing
lawyers coming before the court. Also, would you not think the
most effective way to brief and argue a case would be using these
kind of factors, the text, the ones that you listed from P.J. Video.
If lawyers would apply these factors, such as, a showing of
different texts or the sort of history of treatment of the problem
within the state has been different, then these advocacy tools
would be extraordinarily effective. My criticism has been when
courts limit themselves and say we will not disagree unless one of
them is shown. However, whenever I do cases in New Jersey, I
sure try to follow those factors as best I can. So it would be a
good avenue for lawyers; do you think?
Professor Latzer:
The question, as I understand it is, even if the courts do not
follow all the factors in these methodologies that they lay out
before doing state constitutional law, is not the benefit in having
the Bar follow these factors in preparing their briefs in appeals to
the high courts?
Judge Simons:
There is no question that that is so. The cases, in some
instances would come up to us argued almost on an equitable
basis, because there was no type of legal analysis to make.
1998
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Different judges perceive the equities differently, and there was
no route signs for them to follow. That is the very thing that
concerns me. I do not contend that the outline I made in P.J.
Video is the best, or the only outline or method that should be
used; but it is a method. Having been an intermediate court
judge myself, I knew the difficulty of trying to discern what the
Court of Appeals meant. Many times cases came up that had
tried to use the P.J. Video structure, and they were very
understandable and intelligible. You could see what the court
was thinking; you could see some basis for the result they were
reaching. As Professor Williams says, I think a strong argument
can be made by for using these tools, not taking the position that
these are controlling, but that these are the considerations and the
concerns that this court should take into account when it makes a
decision on differentiating similar provisions of the two
constitutions.
The Audience:
Do you think the Court of Appeals is likely to use horizontal
federalism in determining the meaning of state constitutional
provisions, that is looking to see the output of sister states in local
constitution?
Judge Simons:
I do not remember any cases in which we did so in the past.
We may have used Cf cites,46 or some reasoning in some other
state court decisions. Moreover, because state constitutional texts
differ, I do not know of any trend underway to do that in the
future; but as with any kind of analysis there are your sister court
46 THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 23 (16TH ed. 1996).
"Cited authority supports a proposition different from the main proposition but
sufficiently analogous to lend support. Literally, "cf." means 'compare.' The
citation's relevance will usually be clear to the reader only if it is explained.
Parenthetical explanations (rule 1.5), however brief, are therefore strongly
recommended." Id.
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decisions, which are helpful for analysis and comparison, and I
think they do shed a light on these questions.
Professor Latzer:
Judge Simons, thank you so much.
Judge Simons:
Thank you.
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